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Inter-firm Collaboration in New Product Development  
in Chinese Pharmaceutical Companies 
                
ABSTRACT 
High-tech firms increasingly rely on inter-firm collaboration (IFC) in new product 
development (NPD). Whilst there is a growing research interest in exploring the economic 
rationale of IFC through the transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource synergy of 
IFC through the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), little attention has been given to the 
institution-based view (IBV) that also has important implications for firms’ choice of IFC. In 
particular, how national institutional environment affects IFC in the NPD process remains 
under-researched. This study aims to contribute to the literature by extending our 
understanding of the role of IFC in firms' NPD process, taking into account transactional, 
resource and institutional factors. Based on a case study of two firms: a state-owned and a 
private pharmaceutical firm in China, our research identifies three key forms of IFC, which 
are dynamic at different stages of NPD and contingent upon an array of institutional, resource 
and transactional rationales underpinning firms' choice of different forms of IFC. Our study is 
the first one that investigates the role of IFC in the NPD process bringing together the IBV, 
RBV and TCE perspectives.  
 
Key words: inter-firm collaboration, new product development, Chinese pharmaceutical 
companies, resource-based view, institution-based view, and transaction cost economies.  
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Introduction  
Firms are increasingly under pressure to enhance both efficiency and flexibility in new 
product development (NPD). Fast technological changes and shortened product life cycles 
drive firms to search for resource synergy through inter-firm collaboration (IFC), such as 
informal cooperation, licensing and strategic alliances (Kanter, 1994; Santoro & McGill, 
2005; Wolter & Veloso, 2008). IFC allows firms to coordinate resources and engage in 
inter-organisational learning (Child, Faulkner & Tallman, 2005; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 
1996; Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 2001). This helps to reduce uncertainty, mitigate risks in 
pursuing breakthrough innovations, and speed up NPD (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng & Heath, 
1996).  
Despite a growing research interest in exploring the economic rationale of IFC through 
the transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource synergy of IFC through the 
resource-based view of the firm (RBV), the institution-based view (IBV) that also has 
important implications for firms’ choice of IFC is under-researched. IBV is especially relevant 
in emerging market economies, such as China, where the institutional environment is dynamic 
and often undermines innovation that requires long-term commitment within firms (Ahn & 
York, 2011; MacMillan, 2007; Peng & Heath, 1996). IFC, as informal substitutes for formal 
institutional support (Hoskisson et al, 2000; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008), enables firms to pool 
resources and share risks, helping to overcome institutional constrains. In other words, IFC 
can be viewed as a constellation of collaborative actions giving rise to heterogeneous 
responses to the institutional environment. Given its relevance, scholars have urged to bring 
institutional factors to the forefront in research on firms' strategic choice in emerging markets 
(Ahn & York, 2011; Meyer et al. 2009; Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). This leads to our 
research question: what role does IFC play in the NPD process in Chinese pharmaceutical 
firms, taking into account the RBV, TCE, and IBV perspectives? 
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We aim to address this question by exploring how firms leverage different forms of IFC 
in the key stages of NPD. Firms' decisions on IFC involve weighing out the potential of value 
creation against the potential costs associated with different forms of IFC (Thompson, 2003), 
on which RBV and TCE offer contrasting insights. The RBV, taking a strategic stance, 
emphasises unique resources in IFC; value creation arises from accessing, mobilising and 
synergising unique resources embedded in collaborative partners (Barney, 1991, 2001; 
Phlippen, 2008; Smith, Vasudevan & Tanniru, 1996). Value creation can emerge not only from 
complementary or supplementary resources embedded in collaborative partners, but most 
importantly, from the collaborative process, in particular, the interaction among NPD teams. 
Conversely, TCE suggests that transaction costs (such as administrative costs and operational 
risks) are key to understand IFC (Silverman, Nickerson & Freeman, 1997; Williamson, 1985, 
2002), and that IFC must be regulated with an appropriate structure to ensure that value 
creation outweighs transaction costs.  
Although RBV and TCE offer insights on transactional and resource factors shaping 
IFC, they overlook institutional contexts where collaborations take place (March, 2005; Li & 
Peng, 2008). TCE focuses on micro-analytical aspects (e.g. opportunism and bounded 
rationality), overlooking the macro-level institutions (e.g. country-level legal and regulatory 
framework). Conversely, RBV focuses on firm-specific resources, neglecting the fact that 
formal and informal institutions, in which firms operate, may affect resource development, 
allocation and acquisition (Ahn & York, 2011; Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Meyer et al., 2009). 
Prior research stresses that national institutional environment exerts substantial impacts on 
how firms associate with external bodies (Li & Peng, 2008), and in emerging economies 
institutional instability even gives rise to inter-firm collaborations (De Clercq, Danis & Dakhli, 
2010). Therefore, research is required to integrate IBV with TCE and RBV to move from 
micro to macro factors, and from context-free to context-embedded factors in understanding 
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IFC as a social-economic phenomenon to overcome institutional barriers in emerging 
economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008).  
Positioned at the intersection between RBV, TCE and IBV, this study aims to contribute 
to the understanding of the role of IFC in firms' NPD process, taking into account 
transactional, resource and institutional factors. Moreover, this study is positioned in a unique 
institutional setting of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. Although the Chinese government 
has promulgated industrial policies and offered financial subsidies to encourage collaboration 
between research institutes, businesses and public services (Zhang, Cooke and Wu, 2011), 
Chinese pharmaceutical firms are still lagging behind in NPD, compared with their 
international counterparts (Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006). Within this industry setting, we 
draw empirical evidence from a case study of two pharmaceutical firms: a state-owned 
company and a private enterprise in Beijing, China. The state-owned company and the private 
firm enterprise provide contrasting institutional contexts in which firm's NPD takes place. 
Their different ownership also means differences in endowed resources and governing 
structure, providing contrasting situations that enrich our understanding of the roles played by 
resource and transactional factors in the NPD process. Therefore, our intersectional theoretical 
positioning combined with the unique research context provides insights on the NPD process 
in Chinese pharmaceutical firms, and the role of IFC in the interaction between Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms and their institutional environment in the NPD process.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Inter-firm collaboration from the resource-based view  
From the RBV perspective, IFC enables access to and deployment of resources embedded in 
different firms (Makadok, 2001). RBV argues that the existence of any forms of organisation 
depends on its possession of valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate and immobile resources (Barney, 
6 
 
1991, 1999). Unique, sticky and embedded (tacit) resources are fundamental to firms' 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Phlippen, 2008; Smith, Vasudevan, & Tanniru, 1996). 
Embedded resources cannot be easily acquired or mobilized through market mechanisms 
(Madhok, 1997; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Teece & Pisano, 1994). Although embedded 
resources can be acquired through ownership transfer, the potential of associated value 
creation may be undermined or lost, especially when such resources are developed over time 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). This is because the acquisition of such resources involves 
‘learning by doing’, observation and intensive communication (Tsoukas, 2003). It requires 
individuals from different organizations to engage in shared practice where strong operational 
integration exists between both parties (Fineman, 2003; Fox, 2000; Li et al., 2014).  
Collaborative partners often possess different embedded resources. The value creation 
potential of IFC is realized only if such differences are exploited for mutual gain (Kim & 
Finkelstein, 2009). Resource complementarity or supplementarity is at the heart of realizing 
IFC's potential. Resource complementarity means that firms are able to create competitive 
advantage by eliminating deficiencies in their resource portfolio (Lambe, Spekman, & Hunt, 
2002). Resource supplementarity means that firms can achieve economies of scale and/or 
scope by integrating resources and capabilities (Harrison, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001), not 
only for cost control but also for value creation. IFC can build on the synergy of 
complementary and supplementary resources, leading to sustainable competitive advantage 
(Espino-Rodriguez & Padron-Robaina, 2006). Therefore, IFC offers firms an alternative to 
build on their own competences by utilising partners for critical skills that firms cannot 
execute, or to exploit opportunities that they do not have sufficient resources to devote to. 
 
 
 
7 
 
Inter-firm collaboration from the transaction cost economics perspective  
TCE sees IFC as a way in which firms relate to other economic entities (Silverman, Nickerson, 
& Freeman, 1997; Williamson, 1985). The effectiveness of IFC is moderated by three key 
transaction cost based factors. First, asset specificity (Williamson, 1983), that is, the 
investment made to an asset that is specific to a given transaction and therefore not deployable 
by other transactions (Williamson, 1985). IFC means that firms will designate investment in 
human capital, physical assets, time and co-ordination, specialised knowledge to the 
collaborative relationship (De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2011). Such designated investment is 
specific to the collaboration, resulting in high switching costs if one partner is to be replaced 
(Williamson, 1981). In the case of high asset specificity, firms benefit from formalising and 
internalising the relationship to mitigate the hazard of opportunistic behaviour.  
Second, uncertainty also has significant impacts on IFC. Uncertainty derives not only 
from opportunism but also bounded rationality - firms’ constrained capacity to access and 
process available information (Simon, 1997). As firms are not able to write contracts that 
cover all possible contingencies (Powell, 1990), risks and costs are involved in making 
specialised investment decisions based on limited available information (Williamson, 1985). 
High uncertainty of transaction outcome implies complexity and high cost to contract and to 
enforce contracts (Thompson et al., 1991), leading firms to turn to highly integrated or 
internalised governance forms (Williamson, 1975). 
Third, IFC is also affected by the frequency of transactions, which can range from 
occasional to recurrent (Williamson, 1979). Due to high set-up costs, firms favour recurrent 
transactions that may lead to long-term collaborations instead of one-off contracts to regulate 
IFC, although bilateral governance structures often give way to unified ones as uncertainty 
increases in recurrent transactions (Williamson, 1981). 
Despite its relevance, TCE ignores that transactions and transferability of resources are 
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often restrained by the organisational context as suggested by the RBV (Zander & Kogut, 
1995) and the wider institutional context as suggested by the IBV. Williamson (1991) himself 
comments that fast changing markets create additional contextual concerns, which are not 
considered by TCE. The value of resources cannot be judged in a vacuum and must be 
considered in the context where the resources are used (Katila & Shane, 2005). In addition, 
both TCE and RBV emerged from the developed countries. Caution should be paid when 
applying TCE and RBV in developing countries, such as China, where the national 
institutional environment is significantly different from the West (Li & Peng, 2008). 
Therefore, IBV is a worthwhile perspective to take into account when analysing IFC.   
 
National institutions and NPD in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry   
National institutional environment serves as a framework to define, limit and regulate 
business interactions in a society (North 1990). Competition within industries and among 
firms is governed by formal (e.g. laws and regulations) and informal (culture and ethical 
norms) institutions (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). National institutional environment also 
creates a platform for all firms to play the game following the same rule. Firms’ decisions are 
constrained or facilitated by the complicated interaction of formal and informal institutions. 
For example, Mahlich (2010) finds that, with the market deregulation and the removal of 
entry barrier in the pharmaceutical industry in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s, under great 
pressure challenged by foreign firms, Japanese firms were forced to adjust their business 
models toward more intensified in-house R&D. While Su, Tsang and Peng (2009) reveal that 
non-Western country specific institutional features in Taiwan affect the innovation pattern of 
its biotechnology industry. Taiwanese firms are stronger in process innovation (routine 
management) but weaker in product innovation (discovery) than firms in the US. In Malaysia, 
Ahn and York (2011) suggest that government’s coordination in helping set up alliances to 
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channel in critical knowledge is more effective in developing its biotechnology industry than 
other institutional policies, e.g. tax incentives. This indicates that institutions matter.   
The pharmaceutical industry in China experienced significant regulatory changes in 
accordance with China’s economic reform. On 1st January 1993, the major amendments to the 
Patent Law came into effect in China, marking a historical transformation for the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry (SIPO, 2011). Until 1993, only the pharmaceutical methods were 
protected. The 1993 amendments stipulate that the pharmaceutical products, methods and 
usage could be all patented, endowing inventors with true rights (Hill & Judith, 1993). These 
terms mean that Chinese pharmaceutical firms could no longer produce drugs patented by 
foreign companies after 1993. This leaves Chinese pharmaceutical firms with three choices 
for business development: to manufacture generic drugs once their patents expire; to purchase 
the intellectual property right of a patent drug, or to invest in developing innovative drugs 
(Cao, 2004).  
Although drug development in China follows a four-phase process similar to that in the 
Western countries: laboratory test (Phase I), animal test (Phase II), clinical trials (Phase III) 
and post marketing surveillance (Phase IV) (CDER, 1998; Dimasi, Hansen & Grabowski, 
2003; FDA, 1998; SFDA, 2005), pharmaceutical firms are currently subject to a series of 
monitoring and certification. For example, pharmaceutical firms must obtain four certificates 
from the State Food & Drug Administration (SFDA, 2005): the first one before doing Animal 
Test (Phase II); the second at the end of the pre-clinical test (Phase I&II); the third one when 
the NPD completes Phase III; and the fourth one, Certificate of Good Manufacturing Practice, 
before carrying out Phase IV. Only with the four certificates, Chinese pharmaceutical firms 
could start Phase IV.  
The above regulatory changes accompanied by a long regulatory approval cycle and 
strong competition from international pharmaceutical companies place an intense pressure on 
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Chinese pharmaceutical firms. In addition, the long NPD process and tremendous resources 
required for NPD in the pharmaceutical industry mean that hardly any single firm has all the 
necessary capabilities to single-handedly pursue NPD (Liebestkind et al., 1996; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004; Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke & Duysters, 2009). IFC offers an alternative route 
to NPD (Ahn & York, 2011; Freeman, 1991; Kogut, 2000; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Oliver, 
2004; Powell 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  
 
Integrating RBV, TCE and IBV 
Prior research has discussed the need for different types of IFC. For example, Liebeskind et al. 
(1996) reveal that trustworthy informal IFC between individual employees and external 
scientists at universities and research institutions acts as the main boundary-spanning 
governance form facilitating the NPD process whereas formal IFC is uncommon at new 
biotechnology firms. Informal IFC offers flexibility to switch from one source of knowledge 
to another without incurring costs, helps increase the scope of organisational learning, and 
hence facilitates the scientific growth of the organisation (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Su, Tsang 
& Peng, 2009). This is echoed by Oliver (2004) and Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), who find 
that at the early 'research' stage of NPD in the biotechnology industry, firms indeed prefer to 
employ informal exchanges, a collaborative or explorative form of relationship, to screen and 
search for new knowledge; in the later 'development' stage of NPD, firms switch to formal 
contracts, a competitive or exploitative form of relationship, to capture value from knowledge. 
However, prior research has not explained how resource, transaction and institution based 
factors interact in firms' IFC. This study addresses this research gap by integrating RBV, TCE 
and IBV.  
In broad terms, existing literature acknowledges that RBV complements TCE (Combs 
& Ketchen, 1999; Madhok, 2002; Mclvor, 2009). Although TCE takes transaction as the unit 
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of analysis while RBV examines resources, transactions and resources are not separable in 
business practice. When firms transact through exchanges, they transact resources (Madhok, 
2002). Firms can be perceived as an avoider of negative opportunism but also a bundle of 
valuable strategic resources that create competitive advantage (Mclvor, 2009). In IFC firms 
can manage opportunistic behaviour through building trust between partners (Child, Faulkner 
& Tallman, 2005). While firms may engage in IFC to minimize the cost of governing the 
exchange activities (Madhok, 2002), they may also seek complementary resources rather than 
an efficient response to the exchange conditions (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Madhok, 2002).  
Existing literature also suggests that IBV complements TCE and RBV (Li & Peng, 2008; 
Meyer et al., 2009; North, 1990; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Both TCE and RBV are 
criticized as context-free and US-centric theories (March, 2005; Li & Peng, 2008). TCE 
focuses on micro-analytical aspects, e.g. opportunism, but overlooks macro-level national 
institutions that affect transaction costs (North, 1990; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). For 
example, a weak institutional environment results in a lack of transparent information and 
augments information asymmetries, which increases risks and costs associated with partner 
selection (Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009). On the other hand, RBV highlights firm-level 
resources, but neglects institutional factors that affect firms' access to resources through 
market mechanisms (Ahn & York, 2011; Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). For instance, in 
developed countries where institutional environment supports market, firms can bid for 
resources, while in developing countries immature institutional environment may create 
barriers for firms to access resources through market exchanges (Meyer et al., 2009). Hence, 
firm-specific resources also reflect formal or informal constrains or enablers of a particular 
institutional setting that firms confront (Ahn & York, 2011; Peng, 2002).  
Embedded in the institutional setting, firms are rewarded to conform to institutional 
requirements by achieving increased legitimacy, institutional recognition and support, and 
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survival capabilities. Firms that have a high level of institutional support for resources can 
attain competitive advantage through possessing 'institution-based resources' (Tokaranyaset, 
2013) or 'institutional capital' (Oliver, 1997), in the forms of social (embedded in network), 
political (connection with governments) and reputational (reduce information asymmetry 
between firms and stakeholders) capital (Peng, Lee & Wang, 2005). Building on Dosi (1994), 
Williamson (1999) acknowledges that firms' boundary spanning activities must be understood 
by incorporating not only the TCE but other elements, such as learning, path-dependency, 
selection, technological opportunities, and complementary assets. Therefore, an integrative 
approach incorporating both micro and macro levels as well as context-free (TCE and RBV) 
and context-embedded (IBV) elements is needed to conduct research in China to reflect on its 
unique institutional setting (Li & Peng, 2008).  
  
Research Methods 
We adopted a qualitative case study research strategy (Yin, 2009) to allow us to focus on our 
key objective - to investigate the role played by IFC in the NPD process taking into account 
TCE, RBV and IBV in Chinese pharmaceutical firms. Complexity in China's institutional 
setting requires in-depth, qualitative investigation to gain insights with empirical substance 
and potentials for theorisation (Ghauri, Gronhaug & Kristianslund, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). In particular, we draw on Yin's (2009) ''two-case'' case study design, because analytical 
conclusions independently emerging from the two cases are more powerful than a single case 
study alone (Yin, 2009). Despite this, we are fully aware that findings from two cases, whilst 
useful to reveal insights of the role of IFC in NPD in Chinese pharmaceutical firms, may not 
be generalizable to other firms or research contexts. 
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Case selection and data collection 
We followed Buck’s (2011) guidelines for case selection. Gaining research access in China is 
challenging (Zhao et al. 2006), especially to pharmaceutical firms, due to sensitivity and 
confidentiality issues (Hirsch, 1995). Even when the initial access is granted, continued access 
that offers the researcher long enough time to interact with the interviewees in order to collect 
relevant, sufficient and reliable data cannot be guaranteed (Gummesson, 2000). The use of 
personal contacts and social networks is found to be an effective way to gain full cooperative 
access to Chinese firms (Liang & Lu, 2006).     
We adopted a two-stage case selection process to overcome these challenges to conduct 
the case study in 2008 and 2009, then kept up to date with the recent NPD development of the 
two firms till the end of 2014 based on secondary data (e.g. the company websites, annual 
reports and other trade publications). We started with an informal sampling selection with 
these broad selection criteria: high-tech enterprises operating in pharmaceutical sector located 
in Beijing where there is a density of high-tech firms (Yam et al., 2004). We then applied the 
following criteria to screen firms in the first stage: (a) as the focus of this study is based on 
the NPD process (CDER, 1998; FDA, Food & Drug Administration, 1998; SFDA, 2005), 
firms that only produce generic drugs, and traditional Chinese medicine are excluded; (b) 
since a complete NPD process in the pharmaceutical industry takes a long time (PhRMA, 
2013), firms included in this study must have operated for at least 10 years. Based on these 
criteria, we approached firms recommended by personal contacts and by cold calls, resulting 
in four selected firms.   
In the second stage, we applied theoretical sampling and identified two firms (labelled 
as Pharmastate and Diagno in Table 1) from the four initial cases, based on theoretical not 
statistical reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, the unit of analysis is firm. Our rationales 
are: (a) as this study considers institutional environment, we chose two firms from the same 
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pharmaceutical industry to hold industry constant. Further, the choice of a state-owned firm 
(Pharmastate) and a private enterprise (Diagno) helped reveal the dynamics of institutional 
environment within the pharmaceutical industry; (b) the different governance structures in 
state-owned and private enterprises provided contrasting insights on endowed resources and 
organisational context, helping with the understanding of transaction and resource based 
factors in the NPD process; (c) both firms invested in NPD intensively. Pharmastate was one 
of top five pharmaceutical firms in China in terms of investment in NPD and sales, while 
Diagno was the leading firm in Hepatitis B research in China. Pharmastate developed more 
than 10 patented products, and Diagno had two patented products. Moreover, the two firms 
selected were willingness to take part and hence our continued access was granted. Therefore, 
our two cases - one state-owned and one private in the same industry and location were 
purposely chosen to reduce extraneous variation and focus on our research objective 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1988). 
To collect relevant and in-depth data, we used purposive sampling (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) to identify and select key informants who were most knowledgeable about NPD 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Informants that we selected covered the key roles in the R&D 
Department (Diagno) and the Research Centre (Pharmastate) - the heart of NPD within the 
two case study firms. In Diagno, the R&D Manager had worked there since its conception. In 
Pharmastate, the Manager of Administration responsible for coordinating all the NPD 
activities internally and externally at the Research Centre had worked for the firm for about 
16 years, and the Manager of Information Management responsible for evaluating NPD 
projects, had worked at Pharmastate for 14 years. We also selected other key persons who had 
knowledge about the NPD and management, such as General Manager, Founder, and 
Manager of Production. We conducted five (including 2 follow-up) interviews with selected 
informants in Diagno and three (including one follow-up) in Pharmastate. All interviews were 
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conducted by the authors face-to-face on the respective sites of the firms. Multiple researchers 
allowed the case to be viewed from different perspectives, which enhanced reliability of the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Once we conducted five interviews with Diagno and three 
interviews with Pharmastate, additional insights from further interviews were marginal, 
indicating a point of diminishing returns (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This indicated that the 
number of interviews conducted in each firm was sufficient to reveal the NPD process. 
Therefore, interviews were stopped at this point when incremental learning was minimal and 
no further considerable insights were gained; theoretical saturation was reached (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Glaser &Strauss, 1967).  
The interviews were semi-structured covering two broad dimensions - the two-way 
interaction between national institutions and firms, that is, the influence of national 
institutional environment on firms' choice of IFC and firms' response to institutional 
opportunities and threats. The interview questions included: a. institutional opportunities and 
threats; b. the nature of IFC and stages of NPD; c. the key modes of IFC employed at each 
NPD stage; and d). the rationales of decisions on selecting the modes of IFC at different NPD 
stages. Each interview lasted from one to one and a half hours. All the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed for data coding and analysis. Where available, secondary data, such 
as information on company websites, were gathered. Data collected from different informants 
and from different sources were triangulated to increase the internal reliability of the research 
findings. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Data analysis 
We followed the three key steps of analysing case study data recommended by Eisenhardt 
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(1989), to understand firms' choice of IFC in the NPD process, as well as institution, resource 
and transaction based factors. First, we conducted within-case analysis, by drawing a timeline 
of four key stages of NPD, and then zoomed into each stage to identify IFC used to conduct 
NPD. Second, we conducted cross-case analysis to compare not only similarities, but also 
differences between the two cases in order to capture the interaction between the firms and the 
national institutional environment, and to understand the dynamics involved in shaping firms’ 
choice of IFC. Third, we incorporated the themes emerged from the cross-case analysis to 
build theory of the influence of transactional, resource and institutional factors on firms' 
decisions on IFC. In particular, we identified three IFC modes, as summarised in Tables 2, 3 
and 4. We adopted a case-oriented approach to cross-case analysis that allows, or even 
emphasises diversity in the selection of cases (George & Bennett, 2005; Przeworksi & Teune, 
1982) to elicit both similarities and differences between cases, as opposed to a 
variable-oriented approach in the quest for controlled comparison to discover causal 
association.    
 
 Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 here 
 
Case Background 
Case 1: Pharmastate. Originating as a military medical centre in 1937, Pharmastate became a 
state-owned pharmaceutical company in 1954 and was publicly listed in 1997. Located in 
Beijing and neighbouring with universities and research institutes, Pharmastate enjoyed the 
location advantage to access research resources, outputs and advanced knowledge related to 
NPD. Pharmastate focused on the 'development' of drugs, that is, converting semi-finished 
new products into marketable products. Its own research centre served product development 
for all its subsidiary manufacturers, covering three key product lines: large infusion, 
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cardiovascular medicine, and hypoglycaemic medicine. The research centre’s key 
responsibility was to provide market-ready drugs for the subsidiaries. The speed of 
commercialisation of new drugs was vital for Pharmastate's survival.  
Case 2: Diagno. Unlike Pharmastate, Diagno focuses on 'research' of new drugs, providing 
liver disease diagnosis and treatments. Founded in 1994, Diagno was a private enterprise 
located in Beijing. The Founder was an expert in infectious disease, being the first person who 
proposed immunotherapy in China that marked a departure from the universal but less 
effective treatment for liver disease. The Founder developed a new diagnosis method and 
personalised treatment targeting patients on whom conventional treatment was ineffective. 
Diago’s first patent was a new therapy, including two drugs and a vaccine for Hepatitis B. 
Diagno experienced a very difficult start-up period, and even rented labs to do experiments. 
After more than ten years’ development, Diagno built own research labs and moved from 
outsourcing research to in-house R&D.  
 
Research Findings  
Personal-network initiated collaboration: Phases I&II.  
We found that collaboration was informal and fluid at the initial stages of NPD (Phase I&II) 
when firms focused on exploring new product ideas. In both cases, managers and researchers 
exploited personal networks with doctors and scientists at hospitals and research institutes. 
However, Pharmastate and Diagno used their informal and personal networks for different 
purposes due to their contrasting NPD focuses. Pharmastate focused on fast development and 
marketisation of new drugs, while Diagno specialised in cutting edge live disease research 
(Table 2). Pharmastate considered that personal networks not only offered trustworthy 
channels to identify chemical compounds with commercial potential, but also helped to 
identify semi-complete new products that were available for purchase or licensing to 
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significantly shorten NPD turnaround time. ‘We rarely start from lab research to screen 
potential drug entries. We normally step in from pre-clinical trial stage, namely, others have 
developed a new product entry, and we then do clinical trials together. Sometimes we take 
over and start from animal test (Phase II). Even so, the investment required has been 
considerable’ (Information Departmental Manager, Pharmastate).  
In contrast, Diagno employed personal networks to gain forefront knowledge and 
technology in the field. ‘In one of the conferences in the US, during the coffee break, a 
leading international expert on cancer approached me as we adopted the same approach to 
treat cancer and Hepatitis - improving the immune system, but he developed a new drug with 
much advanced technology than mine. He invited me to collaborate with him by testing his 
innovative medicine on Hepatitis... I brought them [his innovative medicine] back to China 
and completed this research project in a Hepatitis research centre in Qinhuangdao, Hebei 
province, where I had personal contacts: my previous teacher, a leading person in Hepatitis 
who was responsible for Hepatitis research in Asian Pacific, invited me to collaborate with 
him in Qinhuangdao; the head of Qinhuangdao Municipal Bureau of Health invited me to 
help establish Hepatitis research centre and we became good friends.’ This collaborative 
research as well as other similar collaborations through personal networks helped Diagno 
overcome resource constraints in its Phases I & II research in its early days. With the 
accumulated income generated through these collaborations, Diagno bought a new building 
and moved its research from a rented basement to own labs after two years in operation.  
Moreover, Pharmastate and Diagno considered the boundary of IFC differently. 
Pharmastate found that collaborative relationships through personal networks could expedite 
the new product filtering process compared with in-house R&D, and also reduce the 
administrative outlay associated with in-house R&D. ‘These scientists are national experts 
and they work in the prestigious Academy of Science and Technology. It will cost us a fortune 
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to even hire one of them, let alone a whole team.’ (Manager of Administrative Dept., 
Pharmastate). In contrast, Diagno used personal relationships with doctors and scientists to 
form an ad-hoc advisory board that served as an extended R&D function of the firm. 
‘Friendship [-based] relations are critical because they are the origin of innovation, the 
exchanges with these experts both home and abroad kept our research forefront, not in a 
closed way.’ (Founder of Diagno).  
In both cases, contracts were seldom used to specify the responsibilities of collaborative 
partners given the informal nature of collaboration. The role of the 'external experts' was 
ambiguously defined to allow flexibility in the collaborative relationship. Interestingly, 
trust-based relationships built on personal networks enabled firms to be the first to gain access 
to reliable and critical new product information at not only the research forefront, but also the 
market forefront. On the market side, firms worked closely with medical practitioners to 
identify new product and market gaps. Practising doctors were particularly informative about 
new product gaps, supply and demand gap of certain products, and products that were well 
received and had high market growth potentials.  
IFC at the initial stages of NPD was by no means random, and the search for 
collaborative partners did not rely entirely on personal connections. Institutional factors were 
found indispensible in shaping firms' choice of IFC in the NPD process. First, strategic 
priorities were different in Pharmastate and Diagno, due to their different ownership and 
management. Diagno, as a private enterprise where the Founder was a leading doctor in the 
field and focused on R&D as the source of competitiveness and survivability, was willing to 
invest in research in its early days. Pharmastate, as a state-owned enterprise where the CEO 
was assigned by the Chinese Communist Party with fixed terms (3-5 years), was unwilling to 
invest in basic research that required long-term commitment and involved greater 
uncertainties. Pharmastate's priority was to commercialise innovation and increase sales 
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within the manager's tenure. Short-term performance was paramount for Pharmastate, and its 
decision on NPD was made on political or nonmarket motivations.  Therefore, institutional 
factors influenced managerial perception of transaction costs and organisational goals and 
resource allocation.  
Second, the Chinese government encouraged collaboration between pharmaceutical 
companies and universities to expedite the commercialisation of scientific research. Located 
in Beijing concentrated with renowned universities and research institutes, Pharmastate and 
Diagno had geographical advantage to collaborate with universities and research institutes. 
Finally, after China joined the WTO in 2001, it was under increasing pressure to 
enforce the new Patent Law introduced in 1993, responding to the need for knowledge 
protection among foreign pharmaceutical companies entering the Chinese market. This also 
motivated Chinese pharmaceutical firms to seek IFC to speed up NPD. ‘Foreign 
Pharmaceutical companies are years ahead of us in terms of new drugs developed. If we start 
by investing in basic research, we may never be able to compete with these companies. We 
have to speed-up the process and pair with research institutes, who can assist us to 
understand current trends [of medical development] and sometimes to predict the next 
generation of new medicines’ (Manager of Administrative Department, Pharmastate). 
   
Arms-length collaboration: Phase III.   
The clinical trial stage (Phase III) of NPD involved a higher level of specific assets in IFC due 
to firm’s early commitment, exposing to greater hazards of opportunistic behaviour as the 
NPD becomes more tangible than that in the pre-clinical stage (Phases I & II). Therefore, an 
informal and ad-hoc collaborative partnership was not suitable. Both Pharmastate and Diagno 
had contractual relationships in place with hospitals as the major form of IFC. Additionally, 
Pharmastate licensed in semi-finished research output with high commercialisation potential, 
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whereas Diagno licensed out its in-house research output to generate extra income.    
Phase III required a great deal of resources and capabilities. Pharmaceutical companies 
working with hospitals would gain access to resources, including doctors and patients, for 
clinical trials. ‘It costs about RMB50 million to do clinical trials to develop one of our 
vaccines into a drug. It is impossible for us to do it ourselves without collaborating with a 
hospital. It requires at least 200 samples, and we have to trace each patient for about two 
years to look at the effect of the vaccine on the immune system. Sometimes, the patients stop 
to come as they feel a positive effect after 1 year, and leaving us an unfinished case. It hence 
increases the cost if we want to continue to trace’ (Manager of R&D Department, Diagno). In 
addition, scientists at hospitals were also keen to advance their research to enhance their 
career reputation, and knowledge gained through collaboration with firms for new discoveries 
at the operational level can be directly fed back into their on-going R&D, which could not be 
obtained from market. Both pharmaceutical firms and doctors and scientists at the hospital 
could access to complementary resources and capabilities.   
However, given the critical and confidential NPD information involved in the clinical 
trial stage, formal contract-based arm's length form of IFC was preferred to set out 
responsibilities and legal terms of collaboration. Both Pharmastate and Diagno reported that a 
long-term arm's length collaboration helped to maintain open access to critical on-site data, 
encourage intensive interaction between collaborative partners and make timely adjustments 
to the new product over an extended period of time. Therefore, a close work relationship and 
frequent contacts with experts in hospitals allowed Chinese pharmaceutical firms to observe 
and learn from the collaboration. Such close and frequent contacts also facilitated sharing of 
tacit knowledge. ‘We have to cooperate with hospitals as we have to know what is exactly 
happening when the product is being tested, and we need first-hand materials. We monitor the 
process together with doctors there, discuss and work on problems. Sometimes we need to 
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bring these problems back and think how to solve them, and then go back to the hospital for 
several times (General Manager, Diagno)’.  
Institutional factors moderated IFC at the clinical trial stage. Unlike clinical trial in 
developed countries where pharmaceutical firms or sponsors determine the locations of the 
trials (FDA, 2014), the Chinese government announced a list of organisations qualified for 
conducting clinical trials. This meant that clinical trials of new drugs were highly 
concentrated among a small number of hospitals. By engaging in a legal contractual 
relationship, collaborative partners were obliged to protect information. In addition, 
pharmaceutical firms had to abide by the SFTA’s regulation to provide clinical data from a 
recognised hospital if they wanted a new drug to be approved.  
 
Lead operator centred collaboration: dual or triple trajectories in Phase IV.  
Once a clinical trial has been successfully completed, firms can obtain a new drug certificate 
and a drug manufacturing certificate. With the two certificates as well as the other two 
obtained from Phases I and II, firms' NPD moves to the final stage - manufacturing and 
marketing. This stage is characterised by high asset specificity due to firms' earlier 
commitment, the greater innovation certainty as NPD approaches to completion, and the need 
for different resources and capabilities for production and marketing. Both Pharmastate and 
Diagno internalised core production and outsourced peripheral activities. They acted as lead 
operators - a central hub hosting multiple forms of IFC. Pharmastate was careful when 
collaborating with partners. ‘If a new product contains confidential information and is crucial 
to the firm, we will do it in-house, as the costs of knowledge leaking through IFC might be 
much higher than we do it by ourselves; or we may break it down into small pieces until 
making it impossible for others to interpret our NPD, we will ask others to do the most 
difficult and costly part, and then we collect and integrate them to continue the rest of 
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research’ (Manager of Information Dept., Pharmastate). Similarly, Diagno was capable of 
in-house production, and outsourced only peripheral activities with low value creation 
potential by using one-off contract based collaboration. 
Lead operator centred IFC allows firms to focus on core competencies, and at the same 
time, fully exploits internal and external resources. As a lead operator, firms are in control of 
allocating and deploying resources rationally. ‘We normally carry out the core part of the 
production and outsource the rest. For example, if we think that we need to recruit expert 
people and invest in new equipment, which may not be used in the future after the completion 
of manufacturing this product, we will seek to cooperate with others who are experienced in 
doing that with higher efficiency and lower costs than us’ (Manager of Information 
Department, Pharmastate).  
Once again, institutional factors influenced the firms' choice of IFC. Due to its state 
ownership, Pharmastate enjoyed more advantages than Diagno. First, contrary to the practice 
in the developed countries where market mechanisms support voluntary exchanges and firms 
can acquire critical resources through friendly or hostile bid, investment funds in China were 
controlled and allocated by the government (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). The venture capital 
industry was underdeveloped. Hence, the majority of funds were invested in state-owned 
enterprises rather than in private enterprises. Therefore, the national institutional environment 
in China enabled Pharmastate to access financial resources for NPD, but constrained Diagno 
that struggled to raise funds for research, e.g. Diagno even sourced in non-core research (skin 
cosmetics) to generate extra income to re-invest in the core research.   
Second, in a market where accurate market information is not always readily available, 
Pharmastate benefited from its endowed 'non-market forms of capital' (its good political 
relationship with governments and its reputation) (Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005: 624) and its 
drugs were enlisted as government subsidised drug in all state-owned hospitals. In contrast, 
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Diagno had to spend more efforts and costs to market their new products.  
Finally, the legislative and administrative power of the Chinese state to protect 
intellectual property was insufficient to deter opportunistic behaviour (Teece, 1986). In fact, 
interviewees in both firms concurred that in-house production was preferred at this stage. 
Overall, interviewees expressed that Chinese pharmaceutical firms preferred to develop their 
own patent drugs in an increasingly regulated pharmaceutical industry in China, as it was 
considered the only way to increase their competitiveness. For example, the number of patent 
drugs in Pharmastate reached 13 in 2006, whereas Diagno was seeking potential partners to 
invest in its own hospitals and factories to conduct all R&D activities in-house.  
 
Discussion 
Prior literature on IFC concentrates on the TCE and the RBV perspectives, and overlooks 
national context where collaborations take place. By incorporating the RBV, TCE and IBV, 
this research contributes to the strategic management literature by enhancing our 
understanding of the nature of IFC and its role in the interaction between Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms and their institutional environment in the NPD process, based on a case 
study of two Chinese pharmaceutical firms. In particular, our study has two theoretical 
implications.      
First, our findings show that three key forms of IFCs are pertinent to NPD: 
personal-network initiated collaboration at Phases I&II, arm's length collaboration at Phase 
III and lead-operator-centred collaboration at Phase IV. In addition to the three key forms of 
IFC, licensing in, as a supplementary form, can be used at different stages of NPD to purchase 
in semi-finished research outputs with high commercialisation potential, especially by the 
state-owned firm with resource advantage. The existing literature (Koza & Lewin, 1998; 
Oliver, 2004; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) generally states that informal explorative forms of 
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IFC are employed at the early stage of NPD while formal exploitative forms of IFC are 
preferred in the later stage of NPD (Afuah, 2001; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Our findings 
support this, but we have gone a step further by capturing what and how a particular form of 
IFC is employed at different stages of NPD and by revealing a dynamic and contingent nature 
of IFC, rather than a static view at one point. Therefore, the key forms of IFC identified in this 
study deepen our understanding of the role of IFC and how firms can employ different forms 
of IFC to overcome institutional constraints on NPD in the pharmaceutical industry. It also 
offers practical insights for pharmaceutical firms in choosing modes of IFC in NPD.    
Second, our findings support that institutional factors should be given more attention in 
research (Peng, Jiang & Wang, 2008; Meyer et al., 2009), as they interact with transaction and 
resource based factors in firms' strategic choices, especially in emerging markets. By drawing 
on TCE, RBV and IBV, our study unveils the nature of each form of IFC and the underlying 
logic of the shift from one to another along the NPD phases - this was a missing link in the 
existing literature (Madhavan & Grover, 1998; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Oliver, 2004; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). In particular, our study discusses the two-way interaction 
between national institutions and firms - the influence of national institutions on firms' choice 
of IFC and firms' response to institutional opportunities and threats, based on a case study of 
two firms with different ownership structures. To some extent the institutional context in 
China is more advantageous to state-owned firms than private firms (Oiver, 1997; Peng, Lee 
and Wang, 2005; Tokaranyaset, 2013). State-owned firms' historical connections with the 
State (e.g. Pharmastate was developed from the military medical centre, and had CEOs 
assigned by the State), public reputation, social and political capital help them overcome 
certain barriers to NPD, for example, through access to financial resources (e.g. government 
sponsored university-firm collaborative research, investment funds, and venture capital) and 
distribution channels (e.g. drugs to be included in government funded drug selling list in 
26 
 
hospitals). These factors also allow state-owned firms to be kept abreast of scientific 
discoveries, new technologies, and collaborative and investment opportunities, as well as 
helping to reduce NPD risks and costs. In contrast, in a context where the venture capital 
industry is underdeveloped and accurate market information is not readily available, private 
firms have to find their own ways to raise research funds, and spend money to search 
information and to promote its NPD outputs. Therefore, the national institutional environment 
in China favours state-owned firms to acquire critical resources. In sum, the national 
institutional environment can facilitate or hinder firms in resource acquisition and influence 
transaction costs. Hence, an integration of the TCE, RBV and IBV is meaningful to help us 
understand firms' rationales of choosing and shifting forms of IFC in the NPD process.    
At the early stage of NPD (Phases I & II), personal-network initiated collaborations 
allow informal and trust-based interactions, and responsibilities of partners to be ambiguously 
defined. This form of IFC entails economic efficiency in terms of little administrative and 
switching cost according to the TCE. Resources offered by collaborative partners are 
knowledge-based, highly personal or firm-specific, and path-dependent. Replacement and 
substitution of such embedded resource profiles are difficult to achieve through market 
exchanges and costly to develop in-house from the RBV perspective. However, our 
between-case analysis shows that, although the two firms both adopted personal-network 
initiated collaborations at the early stages of NPD, they were driven by different strategic 
priorities, which TCE and RBV fail to capture. While the state-owned firm proactively sought 
IFC in order to avoid doing Phases I & II stages in-house, the private firm explored IFC in 
order to strengthen its core research and expecting to do it in-house completely.  
Different from the firms in the developed countries where firms' governance structure is 
self-defined, managers in the state-owned firms in China are assigned by the government with 
fixed terms (an institutional factor according to the IBV). Therefore, managers in state-owned 
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firms are less willing to invest in basic research which is resource-demanding, 
time-consuming, and with high uncertainties than the private firm. Instead, they focus on 
profit maximisation through speeding up NPD commercialisation. In addition, the location 
convenience by neighbouring with universities and research institutions, and the 
government’s call for collaboration between firms and research institutions in NPD stimulates 
firms to explore the various personal collaborations with universities and research 
organisations, from both TCE and RBV perspectives. The above evidence proves that the 
context where the transactions are conducted and resources are exchanged determines how 
and why IFC is employed by Chinese pharmaceutical firms to pursue the early stages of NPD. 
Therefore, the RBV, TCE and IBV must be taken into account to understand the intricacies of 
IFC.  
When NPD moves to the clinical trial stage (Phase III), firms refine the collaborative 
boundaries by replacing the personal-network initiated collaboration with a long-term 
agreement-based arm's length collaboration. As the value of NPD becomes more certain, the 
incentive for knowledge appropriation increases. Both state-owned and private firms turn to 
the same mode of IFC: arm's length formal agreement, a governance providing mechanisms 
of knowledge protection compared with informal personal-network initiated collaborations. In 
long-term agreement-based arm's length collaboration, from the TCE perspective, partners' 
responsibilities and legal consequences of breaching the contract are defined, and a long-term 
engagement also discourages opportunism of collaborative partners (Powell, 1990). Besides, 
both the state-owned and private firms are short of critical resources for conducting NPD, 
such as doctors with expertise knowledge, patients as trial participants, and physical facilities, 
when it moves to the clinical trial stage. Therefore, the success of NPD at this stage is 
dependent on a combination of firms' intellectual resources of NPD and collaborative partners' 
clinical resources. More importantly, by exploiting complementary resources in joint and 
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integrated operations, an agreement-based form of collaboration allows firms to closely 
observe, communicate with, and learn from doctors at collaborative partners. Such practice is 
conducive to sharing tacit knowledge often required for developing and enhancing in-house 
R&D, an important aspect highlighted by RBV.  
   Firms' choice of arm's length contract-based collaboration is not only a balance 
between resource and transactional factors, but also a regulatory requirement in the 
pharmaceutical industry in China. Different from that in developed countries where 
pharmaceutical firms or sponsors have the freedom to choose the site (hospitals or research 
centres) for clinical trials (FDA, 2014), in China pharmaceutical firms are forced to choose 
from a list of government nominated hospitals where clinical data can be gathered, as part of 
requirements for new drug approval. This suggests that national institutions can constrain 
resource allocation and acquisition, implying that resources and national institutions are not 
isolated, but interact each other (Meyer at al 2009), highlighting the interaction between IBV 
and RBV.     
In final Phase IV, firms' effort shifts from research to development and their 
collaboration boundary is also redefined. Contrary to some existing literature that indicates 
firms will inevitably internalise collaborative relationships (Olive, 2004; Oxley & Sampson, 
2004), our findings show firms position as a lead-operator-centre in IFC. With the two case 
study firms, both ownership and ad-hoc project-based contracts are simultaneously employed. 
The TCE provides partial explanation to this phenomenon. The NPD at this stage contains the 
highest level of specific asset resulting from early commitment. The uncertainty is also high 
because the technical newness induces misappropriation (Liebeskind et al., 1996). Even legal 
contracting may not be sufficient to prevent misappropriation (Liebeskind et al., 1996), 
especially in an environment, such as China, where intellectual property is insufficiently 
protected (Meyer, 2008) (highlighting the interaction of IBV and TCE). To build stronger 
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knowledge protection, firms internalise collaboration to protect their technological knowledge 
against threats of opportunistic behaviour associated with the collaborative partnership 
(Griffith, Harmancioglu & Droge, 2009; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) (stressing the interaction 
between IBV, RBV and TCE).  
However, TCE ignores that not all specific assets necessary for the NPD in Phase IV fall 
in firms' core competences and could be developed in-house competitively. Those that have 
low value creation and do not require specific investment are outsourced to sub-contractors 
who can do it with higher efficiency and lower costs through one-off contracts. To contrast 
with the ownership governance form, one-off contracts shield the IFC by specifying the legal 
consequences of breaching the terms of collaboration. The combination of in-house and 
outsourcing NPD is echoed by Leiblein and Miller (2003) in the semiconductor industry 
where greater uncertainty only leads to integration when the transaction involves high value 
of asset specificity; those with low value of asset specificity are likely being outsourced. 
Additionally, a third form of IFC is found in our case study: non-core research is sourced in to 
generate sufficient income to re-invest in the core research by the private enterprise. The 
above provides evidence of the interaction between IBV, RBV and TCE.  
Contrary to TCE's claim that firms follow a governance continuum moving from market 
towards integrated governance with reduced number of IFCs (Williamson, 1999), our findings 
suggest that pharmaceutical firms, as they progress through the NPD stages, internalise the 
core part of NPD at the final stage but maintain different modes of IFC (Powell, 1996; 
Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006). The dynamic choice of IFC enables the Chinese 
pharmaceutical firms to break through certain institutional barriers and overcome their 
inherited vulnerabilities (Wei, 2008) to pursue innovative activities.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
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Conclusions 
This study firstly identifies three key forms of IFC employed at different stages of NPD, and 
secondly investigates the institution, transaction and resource-based rationales underpinning 
firms' choice of different forms of IFC. Each form of IFC has its distinctive features and the 
optimal choice is made based on its effectiveness and efficiency in breaking down 
institutional barriers to NPD, gaining resource advantage, and mitigating transaction costs. 
Thirdly, firms' choice of IFC is dynamic and contingent upon the interaction of institution, 
resource and transaction based factors at play, and multiple forms of IFC may be employed to 
maximise the benefits of IFC. Our findings contribute to knowledge on IFC in the NPD 
process by cross-fertilising the IBV, RBV, and TCE perspectives in an under-researched 
emerging market economy.  
Despite our contribution, our study has limitations. Our findings are supported by data 
from two cases. While the purposely selected two cases offer useful and relevant evidence on 
how IFC enables NPD in Chinese pharmaceutical firms, our findings may not be 
generalizable to other firms or in different research contexts. Future research is recommended 
to extend our study to other firms in similar or different industry and institutional settings. 
Moreover, the long period of drug development means that it is difficult to trace the whole 
NPD process of a new drug in a longitudinal study. Our findings are drawn from interview 
data from the most appropriate informants who were most knowledgeable about the NPD 
process in the respective firms, despite being a cross-sectional study. Finally, the confidential 
nature of drug research creates barriers to research access to the most valuable part of NPD. 
To address this, we built trust with the participants in the case study firms, approached the 
NPD process from the views of different functional divisions, and also incorporated 
secondary data to triangulate the findings. Nevertheless, there is a scope for longitudinal and 
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more in-depth research to further unpack the roles of institutional, resource and transactional 
factors in firms' choice of IFC in the NPD process.  
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Table 1  The summary of case studies 
 
* as in 2014 ; + average in 2014. Marketing intensity = spending in marketing / sales 
turnover%; ^ R&D spending Includes expenditure on equipment, payment for out-sourced 
research, rent of research facilities and HR outlay of the R&D staff. 
 
 
 
     Case 1 Pharmastate Case 2 Diagno 
Industry sector Pharmaceutical Biopharmaceutical 
Main business 
activities 
Synthetic drugs 
 
Diagnostic agents, Treatment 
therapies, Bio-tech drugs 
Incorporation 1937 1994 
Ownership Publicly listed company (50% state 
ownership) 
Independent,  private 
No. of employees 12,120* 50 * 
Sales turnover RMB¥4.28 billion* RMB¥20 million* 
Industry position  Mass market leader  Niche market dominator 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 R
&
D
 In
di
ca
to
rs
 
R&D intensity 
(R&D spending 
/sales turnover) 
2.5% * 50% * ^ 
No. of R&D staff  300 (2.4%)* 10 (20%)* 
No. of Patents 12 2  
No. of radically 
new products  
2 4 
No. of 
incrementally  
new products  
10 1 
Age of bestselling 
product 
42 11 
Age of newest 
products 
3 2 
 M
ar
ke
tin
g 
Marketing 
intensity  
22%+ 
 
30%+ 
 
No. of marketing 
staff (ratio) 
N/A 15 (30%) 
Target Markets  Domestic, except for 
Large infusion (10% overseas) 
Endocrine (5% overseas) 
Domestic 
Distribution 
chanel  
Specialised distribution firm within 
the corporate group 
Hospitals 
 
 
 
Interviewées 
 
• Manager of Administration, 
Research Centre  
• Manager of Information 
Management, Research Centre 
• Manager of Administration, 
Research Centre 
• Manager of R&D Department (1st 
interview); 
• Manager of R&D Department (2nd  
follow-up interview) 
• Manager of Production Department 
• President (founder) (1st interview)  
• General Manager  
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Table 2.  IFC at Initiation Stage of NPD: I & II 
 
 
  
 
            Cases 
Themes 
 
Case 1 Pharmastate 
 
Case 2  Diagno 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
T
C
E
, R
B
V
 a
nd
 IB
V
 
Formal state 
approval (IBV) 
Approval when moving from Lab Test (I) to Animal Test (II)  
(Certificate 1) 
 
 
 
Institutional 
constraints 
(IBV- TCE 
-RBV) 
Inefficient institutions in China: 
• augment information asymmetry, high costs in searching for information 
• increase difficulties in access key resources through market 
• lead to high potential opportunism and higher partner-related risks   
• CEO: fixed term of office (3-5 years) 
• State pressure on performance within 
the short term of office 
• Non-market motivation: quick profit, 
unwilling to invest in basic research 
• Difficulty in securing funds from 
state 
• Venture capital industry is 
immature, controlled and arranged 
by the state 
• Unaffordable  in-house scientists 
 
 
Institution- 
based risks 
(IBV-TCE- 
RBV)  
• Entry of well-established foreign MNCs 
• Renewed Patent Law (strict regulation on generic drug manufacturing ) 
• CEO: weak means of managing firms 
• Short term of office augmented the 
perceived investment risks in basic 
research 
Challengeable survivability  
 
 
 
 
Institution-base
d resource 
endowment 
(IBV-TCE- 
RBV) 
Preferential policies: encouraging university-firm linked research 
• Political:  
? State-assigned CEO, connection with 
government 
? State-sponsored university-firm 
collaborative projects 
• Reputational:  
? Originated from a military medical 
centre 
? Public reputation 
? One of top five in pharmaceutical 
industry in terms of R&D investment  
• Freedom and self-determination 
in NPD   
• Self-developed reputation: 
 Owners with expertise well 
known in specialized area  
• Self-developed network with 
other hospitals and research 
institutes  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
IF
C
 
 
 
 
Objectives 
     of 
    IFC 
Product-focused: 
• Identify and explore potential drug 
candidates ready to do Clinical Trials 
to shorten NPD process 
• Identify and quickly filter out 
compounds with the biggest 
commercial potential 
Partner-focused: 
• Identify and exploit partnerships 
with trustworthy individuals and 
firms to generate income to invest 
in basic research  
• Identify and exploit partnerships 
with individuals or firms to 
enhance cutting edge research 
competence and position in the 
field 
Collaborative 
Partners 
Research institutes, universities, 
pharmaceutical firms 
Individuals and research institutes 
with shared research interests 
 
Forms of IFC 
Approached through personal 
networks 
  Built upon personal networks 
Licensing-in   
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Table 3.  IFC at the Clinical Trial Stage: Phase III 
 
 
 
           Cases 
Themes 
 
Case 1 Pharmastate 
 
Case 2  Diagno 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
T
C
E
, R
B
V
 a
nd
 IB
V
 
Formal state 
approval      
(IBV) 
 
Certificate 2 and 3 
 
Institutional 
constraints  
(IBV -TCE 
-RBV) 
 
Government determines which hospitals are qualified to provide Clinical Trials 
Limited numbers of hospitals available to choose to do Clinical Trials for a 
specific drug, increased risks in proceeding NPD  
 Relative weaker position in the 
relationship with the hospitals 
compared with big pharmaceutical 
firms 
 
 
Institution- 
based risks 
(IBV-TCE- 
RBV) 
No legislation to protect intellectual property at this stage 
High level of specific assets involved, exposing to greater hazards of 
opportunistic behavior than Phase I&II 
High likelihood of information leakage 
to key competitors (from domestic and 
foreign market) during Clinical Trials 
• Possible information leakage to    
 competitors 
• Limited past experiences from the  
 hospital side 
• Government dictated resources 
ignored highly specialized areas, 
increased risks in doing Clinical 
Trials 
 
 
 
 
Institution- 
based resource 
endowment 
(IBV -TCE 
-RBV) 
• Clear regulations on doing Clinical Trails 
• Information of qualified hospitals to do Clinical Trials is relatively open 
• Financial: 
State allocated funds reduce financial 
burden on investment in Clinical Trials 
with tremendous resources needed  
• Political & reputational:  
? Government connection and  
established reputation enhance trust   
and made it easy to sign collaborative 
contracts with hospitals 
? Well informed by new discoveries  
and semi-finished research outputs  
through political and social network 
• State-owned hospitals or research 
institutes short of expertise 
knowledge in doing clinical trials on 
liver diseases, opportunities for 
exploitation 
• Leading company in the field, 
limited number of competitors from 
both home and abroad 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 I
FC
 
 
 
Objectives 
of 
IFC 
Focus shifted from 'what to develop' to 'how to develop a NP successfully'  
From informal trust-based to formal contract-based   
Partners are bonded by legal obligations 
From short-term to long-term relationship 
Obtain data for product validation 
Learning from intensive cooperation with doctors in hospitals 
Collaborative 
Partners 
Hospitals authorized by the state 
A wide range of hospitals A small number of hospitals 
Forms of IFC Arm’s length collaboration, formal contract 
Licensing -in  Licensing -out 
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Table 4.  IFC at the Product Commercialisation Stage: Phase IV 
 
 
 
 
 
          Cases  
Themes 
 
Case 1 Pharmastate 
 
Case 2  Diagno 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
T
C
E
, R
B
V
 a
nd
 IB
V
 
Formal state 
approval (IBV) 
 
Certificate 4 
 
 
Institutional 
constraints 
(IBV-TCE -RBV) 
 
• Untransparent information increases complexity in distribution and sales  
• Increased competition on patent drug development forces firms to keep 
core part of NPD in-house and outsource peripheral activities to create 
more research capacities  
• State pressure on quick 
commercialization 
• Weak capabilities in marketing 
and sales compared with foreign 
competitors 
• Limited distribution channels 
• Limited funding for production and 
marketing 
Institution-based 
risks (IBV-TCE- 
RBV) 
• Intellectual property is insufficiently protected, increases opportunistic 
behavior 
• Technical newness induces misappropriation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institution-based 
resource 
endowment 
 
(IBV-TCE-RBV) 
State policies encourage commercialization 
• Political: 
Political connections help get drugs 
to be included in the 'List of 
Prescriptive Medicines Approved 
for National Insurance Coverage', 
sold in all state-owned hospitals, 
reduced uncertainty and costs 
• Financial 
State allocated funds offers 
opportunities to acquire drug 
manufacturers national-wide along 
pipe-lines of products to enhance 
commercialization process 
• Reputational: 
Well-established public reputation 
reduces information asymmetry 
between firms and consumers and 
market research costs  
• Self-determined NPD offers 
Diagno freedom to source in 
non-core NP to generate extra 
income to reinvest in core research  
• Self-developed in-house research 
expertise opens windows to potential 
private investors (establishing own 
hospitals on liver diseases 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
FC
 
 
 
 
Objectives 
of 
IFC 
• Shift from ''developing NP' to 'commercializing the research outputs' 
• Outsource peripheral activities to create capacities on core 
research(internalize through ownership to protect tacit technological 
knowledge) 
• Explore and exploit internal and external resources to speed up 
commercialization process and reduce costs 
 Sourcing-in profitable non-core 
research outputs to generate extra 
income to reinvest in core research 
Collaborative 
Partners 
Small manufacturers for manufacturing peripheral products 
 Non-core research project contractors
Forms of 
Collaboration 
Lead-operator-centered collaboration 
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Figure 1. The influence of Institutions on the Chinese Pharmaceutical Firms’ Choice of IFC 
Partners Forms of IFCApproach of IFC 
Exploring-exploiting  
(D focused NPD) 
Exploiting 
(R focused NPD) 
Institutional environment being 
advantageous 
Institutional environment being 
disadvantageous 
Diverse 
Focused 
  
Personal 
network Contractual Dual trajectory
Licensing in
  
Personal 
network Contractual Triple trajectory
Licensing out
